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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court order suppressing Valero's 
statements to law enforcement. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Valero with sexual abuse of a child and lewd conduct 
with a child for sexually fondling a 15-year-old foster child in his care. (R., pp. 
19-20, 51-52.) Valero moved to suppress statements he made to law 
enforcement, contending that they were coerced. (R., pp. 36-37.) The basis of 
the motion was the allegation that Valero did not understand the Miranda rights 
he waived due to language and cognitive difficulties. (Tr., p. 67, L. 22 - p. 68, L. 
14.) 
The district court rejected Valero's argument: It found that Valero had 
been a special needs student more than twenty years previously because of 
problems communicating in English, but that he spoke fluent English at the time 
of the interview. (R., pp. 53-54.) The district court on its own motion, however, 
addressed whether Valero's statements in the interview, given in conjunction with 
a police polygraph examination, were voluntary: 
This Court believes that the statements made to Valero [by 
detective Bartlett] clearly conveyed the message that the 
accusations against Valero were minor in nature, that Bartlett, via 
the polygraph had caught Valero lying about the minor accusations 
and could testify to that 100% in a court of law, and that the 
legal/penal consequences would be worse if he maintained the 
crime of lying to the police than if he admitted touching the breast 
[of the minor child]. Based on that finding, the Court is inclined to 
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conclude that the [sic] Bartlett's tactic was sufficient to overbear 
Valero's will. 
(R., p. 56.) The district court recognized that "this precise issue" had not been 
presented in Valero's motion to suppress, and therefore declared its ruling 
"tentative" and gave the state "an opportunity" to present "legal authority" to 
"meet its burden to demonstrate that the statement was constitutionally 
voluntary." (R., p. 58.) After supplemental briefing (R., pp. 61-66, 70-75), the 
court affirmed and made final its prior tentative order (R., pp. 78-79). The state 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 80-82.) 
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ISSUE 
The district court determined that by downplaying the seriousness of the 
sexual contact with a child while stating that he could testify about polygraph 
results and emphasizing the seriousness of lying to the police the detective 
coerced Valero's incriminating statements. Did the district court err because the 
police tactics employed by Detective Bartlett were not constitutionally coercive 
and did not overbear Valero's will? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Downplaying The Seriousness 
Of The Criminal Acts While Emphasizing The Seriousness Of Lying To The 
Police Was Unconstitutional Police Coercion 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that Detective Bartlett's statements minimizing the 
seriousness of the crime, stating he could testify that Valero was lying, and 
emphasizing the importance of telling the truth had a coercive effect on Valero 
"sufficient to" overbear his will. (R., pp. 56-58.) Although mentioned in the 
opinion, the court at no time employed the correct totality of the circumstances 
test, instead concluding that certain types of misrepresentations are sufficient by 
themselves to coerce incriminating statements. (Id.) The district court's analysis 
is incorrect for two reasons. First, under the correct legal standards Detective 
Bartlett's statements, while possibly misrepresentations, did not amount to 
coercion in a constitutional sense. Second, even if the misrepresentations were 
deemed coercive, the court did not review the totality of the circumstances or find 
that Valero's will was overborne, as required by the applicable legal standard. 
Application of the totality of the circumstances test shows that the court erred as 
a matter of law when it concluded that Valero's incriminating statements were 
coerced. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review, the appellate court gives "deference to the lower court's 
findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages in "free review 
over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show 
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voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,928,894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 
1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal question freely 
reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). 
C. Detective Bartlett's Statements Were Not Coercive 
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
Examples of coercive police action include threats of retaliation for not 
cooperating, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (threats to take children 
from mother and to deny state welfare benefits unless she cooperated were 
coercive), and certain promises in exchange for the confession, Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) (promise by government agent to 
protect inmate from fellow inmates if he confessed coerced confession). Police 
conduct designed to elicit incriminating statements that does not amount to 
coercion includes misrepresentations about the evidence against the defendant, 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (false representation that co-defendant had 
confessed and implicated defendant "insufficient" to render confession 
inadmissible), "[p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of 
security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak," Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990), and general statements that cooperation with 
the police will be to the suspect's advantage, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 
727 (1979). In sum: "Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a 
confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in 
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custodial ones as well, unless the government makes threats or promises." 
United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
The district court concluded statements made by Detective Bartlett "clearly 
conveyed the message that the accusations against Valero were minor in nature, 
that Bartlett, via the polygraph had caught Valero lying about the minor 
accusations and could testify to that 100% in a court of law, and that the 
legal/penal consequences would be worse if he maintained the crime of lying to 
the police than if he admitted touching the breast." (R., p. 56.) This "conveyed 
message," the district court stated, was "sufficient" to overbear Valero's will. (Id.) 
Under the applicable legal standards, however, the "conveyed message" is not 
coercive. 
In Beltz v. State, 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999), the Alaska Court of 
Appeals addressed a claim that an officer had coerced a confession by "[taking] 
advantage of Beltz's agitated mental state by seeming to befriend him and by 
implicitly promising that Beltz would receive lenient treatment if he confessed." 
~ at 478. Beltz argued that "because [the detective] downplayed the 
seriousness of Beltz's crime, Beltz was led to believe that he would suffer no 
consequences if he confessed." ~ The court rejected these arguments, first 
stating that the general rule was that being sympathetic or friendly or professing 
a desire to help the defendant "does not in itself render a subsequent confession 
involuntary." Id. It had rejected similar arguments that "play[ing] on [a 
defendant's] sympathies, minimiz[ing] his guilt, and plac[ing] much of the blame 
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for the [crime] on the victim" had resulted in an involuntary confession. lit 
(citations omitted). The court ultimately held the confession voluntary because 
"Beltz did not interpret [the detective's] remarks as a promise of immunity." Id. at 
479. 
Unlike the Alaska court, the district court in this case effectively held that 
the detective's remarks rose to the level of a promise of immunity. The district 
court relied primarily on United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2010), 
finding it "instructive." (R., pp. 56-58.) In Lall the detective told the defendant 
and his family that "any information [the defendant] shared with the police would 
not be used to prosecute him." Lall, 607 F.3d at 1281. A promise not to use 
statements provided during the interview against the suspect contravenes 
Miranda and is coercive . .l!;l at 1285-87. In the present case, however, Detective 
Bartlett made no statement that can be interpreted as a promise not to use 
Valero's statements against him. Rather than make any such promise, Detective 
Bartlett merely stated generally that telling the truth would be better for Valero 
than lying. In comparison with Lall, Beltz is the more instructive case. 
Another instructive case is Sheriff. Washoe County v. Bessey. 914 P.2d 
618 (Nevada 1996), where the Nevada Supreme Court held that confronting a 
suspect with a fabricated lab report indicating the presence of his DNA on a 
couch on which the victim had reported the sexual abuse took place was not 
coercive. "Cases throughout the country support the general rule that 
confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so long as 
the methods used are not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue 
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statement." 1.!;l at 620. The court listed several types of permissible police 
deception, including "undercover police officers, sting operations, and 
interrogation techniques such as offering false sympathy, blaming the victim, 
minimizing the seriousness of the charge, using a good-cop/bad-cop routine, or 
suggesting there is sufficient evidence when there is not." 1.!;l at 621-22. "As 
long as the techniques do not tend to produce inherently unreliable statements or 
revolt our sense of justice, they should not be declared violative of the United 
States or Nevada constitutions." 1.!;l at 622. 
The most instructive case, however, is an Idaho precedent. In State v. 
Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 894 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995), Wilson was arrested 
based on allegations by his 15-year-old step-daughter that Wilson had engaged 
her in intercourse. When being transported by Lieutenant Skott Mealor, an 
acquaintance of several years, Wilson made incriminating statements, and then 
additional statements at the jail. kl at 927, 894 P.2d at 160. Wilson alleged that 
Mealor "improperly induced him to confess," despite giving him Miranda 
warnings, "[b]y downplaying the seriousness of the charges, by stressing the 
harm that might come to Wilson's family and by making implied promises of 
leniency." 1.!;l at 928-29, 894 P.2d at 161-62. The court, applying the relevant 
law, concluded that because Wilson had in fact understood his Miranda rights the 
acts of downplaying the seriousness of the charges, stressing the harm that 
might come to Wilson's family, and implying that leniency would follow a 
confession did not make the confession involuntary. kl at 929,894 P.2d at 162. 
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Here the techniques engaged in by Detective Bartlett as identified by the 
district court might be considered deceptive, but were not coercive. Those 
techniques included "minimizing the seriousness of the charge," Bessey, 914 
P.2d at 622, which Detective Bartlett did when he stated the accusations were 
not "big deals" and were "minor" (R., p. 52); "suggesting that there is sufficient 
evidence when there is not," Bessey, 914 P.2d at 622, when he told Valero he 
could testify with 100% certainty that Valero had touched the victim's breasts (R., 
p. 53); and telling him that he "would be better off telling the truth, or that [his] 
cooperation might influence the ultimate result of the investigation or prosecution" 
Beltz, 980 P.2d at 478, when he told Valero that he would make things worse, 
and put himself in a "bad spot," if he committed the "crime of lying to the police" 
(R., p. 53). All of the conduct engaged in by Detective Bartlett was within the 
constitutional bounds of proper interrogation. The district court erred by 
concluding otherwise. 
D. The District Court Failed To Review The Totality Of The Circumstances 
Even if the detective's statements could be deemed constitutionally 
coercive, the district court erred when it concluded that Valero's incriminating 
statements were the product of coercion. Although the police conduct must have 
caused the confession, "it does not automatically follow that there has been a 
violation of the Due Process Clause." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 
n.2 (1986). "For a defendant's statement to be found to be involuntarily given, 
the defendant's will must have been overcome by the police at the time of the 
confession." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,929,894 P.2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 
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1995). "[M]isrepresentations, of course, may cause a suspect to confess, but 
causation alone does not constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions following 
interrogations would be involuntary because it can almost always be said that the 
interrogation caused the confession." Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 
(yth Cir., 1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
Here the district court stated it was "inclined to conclude that the [sic] 
Bartlett's tactic was sufficient to overbear Valero's will" because the "tipping 
point" of the interview was "Bartlett's assertion that he could prove 100% that 
Valero was lying and that Valero's denial would certainly carry worse 
consequences than would simply admitting the accusation." (R., p. 56.1) The 
district court then determined that the representations that the criminal act was 
not a big deal, that the detective could testify that the crime happened, and that 
lying to the police would make matters worse were the functional equivalent of 
promising a defendant that his statements would not be used against him. (R., 
pp. 56-58 (quoting United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2010).) At no 
time in its analysis, however, did the court find Valero's will to have been actually 
1 The factual findings of the district court do not support a conclusion that the 
misrepresentations identified by the court caused Valero to make incriminating 
statements. The district court found that Detective Bartlett told Valero that 
"touching the breast is 'not the end of the world, but what is getting you toward 
the end of the world and getting you in a bad spot right now is the crime of lying 
to the police.' Valero once again denied [having touched his foster daughter]." 
(R., p. 53.) Thus, Valero made no incriminating statements in response to 
Detective Bartlett's implication that Valero would be better off if he told the truth 
instead of lied. When Valero later made incriminating statements his own stated 
reason for doing so, as found by the district court, was that "he agreed that if the 
polygraph machine said he did it, then he did it." (R., p. 53.) The factual findings 
of the district court show that it was failure of the polygraph that caused Valero to 
decide to make incriminating statements, not any alleged misrepresentation. 
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overborne (R., p. 56 (statements "sufficient to" overbear will)), and at no point did 
the district court consider in its analysis any of the other circumstances 
surrounding the giving of the incriminating statements (R., pp. 56-58). 
"In making the determination of whether a statement is voluntary, [the 
court] look[s] to the totality of the circumstances." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 
926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). "The underlying purpose of this 
standard is to determine whether the defendant's will was overborne." State v. 
Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. 
Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000». The totality of the 
circumstances here, if actually considered, shows that Valero's will was not 
overborne. 
First, and foremost, Valero was informed of his Miranda rights and 
voluntarily waived them. (R., p. 52.) The Supreme Court of the United States 
has stated that "giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced 
a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even 
though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual 
stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid 
waiver." Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004). Despite the fact that 
the district court found that Miranda rights had been given and waived, and 
despite the fact that such waiver was of singular importance to the totality of the 
11 
circumstances, the district court did not consider the Miranda waiver in its 
analysis. (R., pp. 56-58.2) 
Another significant factor is the length of the interview. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has stated "there is no authority for the proposition 
that an interrogation of this length [three hours] is inherently coercive." Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010). Here the interview 
was "just over 3 hours." (R., p. 52.) The district court erred by failing to consider 
the length of the interview among the totalty of the circumstances. (R., pp. 56-
58.) 
A third significant factor is custody. Indeed, this is often the first factor 
considered by the court in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement. State v. 
Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000) ("In determining whether 
Radford's statements to law enforcement officers on June 4th were voluntary, we 
first note it is undisputed that Radford was not in custody at the time the 
statements were made."). This is because "[m]any of the facts ... used in 
deciding whether the interview was custodial or not are relevant to evaluating the 
voluntariness of [the defendant's] statements." State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 
536, 544, 976 P.2d 462, 470 (1999). Valero was told at the outset that his 
participation in the interview was "on a voluntary basis" and that he was "free to 
2 The district court acknowledged six factors, including whether Miranda warnings 
were given, that should be included in an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances (R., pp. 54-55 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226 (1973», but did not mention any of those six factors in its analysis (R., pp. 
55-58). The district court considered only one factor in its analysis-the three 
misrepresentations it concluded Detective Bartlett had stated in the interview. 
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leave." (R., p. 52.) This important factor, however, goes unmentioned in the 
district court's analysis. (R., pp. 56-58.) 
Finally, there are the characteristics of the defendant, such as his age, 
education, and intelligence. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho at 544, 976 P.2d at 470 
(quoting State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993)). The 
district court found that Valero is 38 years old, graduated from high school, and 
was in special needs education in high school due to language issues but at the 
time of the interview spoke fluent English. (R., pp. 53-54.) The district court did 
not, however, mention these unremarkable characteristics in its analysis. (R., pp. 
56-58.) 
Application of the law to the facts found by the district court shows that 
Valero's statements were voluntary. Factors showing voluntariness include that 
Valero was informed of his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them; he was 
not in custody and therefore not subjected to isolation from support or deprived of 
food or sleep; the interrogation was of a non-coercive duration; and Valero had 
no personal characteristics making him unusually vulnerable. The only factor in 
question is the nature of the interrogation. As shown above, although Detective 
Bartlett did resort to such tactics as downplaying the seriousness of the crime, 
telling Valero that he would be able to testify to Valero's guilt, and that lying to the 
police was very serious and a crime, such tactics are not constitutionally 
coercive. Even if they could be deemed coercive they did not, under the totality 
of the circumstances, overbear Valero's will. 
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The district court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, and 
actually considered only a single circumstance. Consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances as required by the applicable legal standard shows there was 
no improper coercion and that Valero's will was not overborne even if there had 
been such coercion. The district court therefore committed reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence of Valero's statements and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2011. 
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